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One factor that contributes in the size of the shadow economy is the regulation of business activi-
ties. This paper provides empirical analysis of the effects of regulatory discretion on the unoffi -
cial economy. It adds to the previous fi ndings by gathering evidence from a large data set of 162 
countries for the 1999 to 2007 period. Going beyond simple correlation, it uses the Arellano–Bond 
estimator to investigate the dynamics and causal effects of regulation on the shadow economy. We 
fi nd that increase in regulation increases the size of the shadow economy. 
Keywords: unoffi cial or shadow economy, corruption, replication, regulation, Arellano–Bond es-
timator, panel data 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The existence of shadow economy or unrecorded business activity is a complex 
phenomenon. It has been investigated from various perspectives in different dis-
ciplines (Guha-Khasnobis et al. 2006). For many economists, the main cause 
for the existence of a shadow economy is the excessive regulation of private 
business activity (Laoyza 1996; Ihrig – Moe 2004; Dabla-Norris et al. 2008; An-
derson 2012). In particular, previous studies identify three predictions about the 
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link between shadow economy and regulation (Johnson et al. 1997, 1998). First, 
that greater regulation of economic activity leads to greater unofficial economy. 
Second, a higher tax burden, as perceived by economic agents, turned them away 
from the official sector. Third, that corruption accompanies the unofficial activity 
(Dreher – Schneider 2010; Buehn – Schneider 2012).  
Regarding the link between regulation and the unofficial economy, previous 
studies lack adequate coverage of the countries (e.g. the sample used by Johnson 
et al. (1998) comprises 49 countries which reduces observations in some specifi-
cations to as low as 34; Dabla-Norris et al. (1995) have a sample of 41 countries). 
Moreover, they lack coverage of East Asia and Africa, the two biggest regions 
in terms of population and number of countries. This makes it difficult to extract 
general conclusions from these studies. 
The findings on the link between tax burden and the informal sector are mixed. 
The issue is to determine whether a higher tax burden drives firms out of the 
formal sector, or whether an increasing informal sector causes low tax revenues 
for the government and consequently a higher tax burden (e.g. Végh 1989; Rou-
bini – Sala-i-Martin 1995; Koreshkova 2006; Blackburn – Powell 2011; Mazhar 
– Meon 2012). 
Opinions on how the shadow economy relates to corruption are also mixed. 
The studies that interpret corruption as a form of tax on operating firms reach 
the conclusion that the unofficial economy and corruption are complements (e.g. 
Hindriks et al. 1999; Hibbs – Piculescu 2005). In contrast, studies that assume 
that firms go informal primarily to avoid corrupt bureaucracy conclude that cor-
ruption and the informal economy are substitutes (Choi – Thum 2005; Dreher et 
al. 2009).  
This paper attempts to provide empirical findings on these links to clear am-
biguities by investigating the direction of causality. It employs a larger data set 
of 162 countries (country coverage varies from 118 to 158 countries in different 
estimations depending on the availability of right hand side variables). This study 
uses a panel data set and also investigates the causal link between regulation and 
the unofficial economy. It allows us to provide a causal interpretation for these 
theoretically ambiguous links. We find broadly similar results to previous stud-
ies, i.e. various measures of regulation increase the size of the shadow economy. 
However, the results from causality analysis are inconclusive. It may indicate the 
complexity of the shadow economy and the need for further research. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The second section describes the 
data and methodology, the third and fourth sections detail the results of simple 
and causality analysis respectively, while the fifth section concludes. 
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2.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Following Johnson et al. (1998), I have estimated the following empirical relation: 
Unofficialit = α + β[Regulatory Discretion]it + γ[Control]it + εit ,
where Unofficialit denotes size of the unofficial sector as a percent of GDP for 
country i in the year t, α denotes the constant, β is the coefficient, and ε is the 
composite error term with usual assumptions. The Regulatory Discretion is cap-
tured in three different ways: (a) through different measures of the business regu-
lation; (b) by using different measures of tax burden; and (c) by the indices of the 
rule of law and corruption. Each of these variables is used in turn to estimate the 
above equation controlling for the per capita GDP.   
The data for the unofficial economy is from Schneider et al. (2010). They 
provide the largest available panel data set on unofficial economic activities, cov-
ering 162 countries from 1999 to 2007. They estimate the size of the shadow 
economy relative to the official GDP using the DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple 
causes, multiple indicators) method.1 For the other explanatory variable, I have 
relied on various sources. Details of the data sources and definitions of the vari-
ables are given in Table A. 
3. RESULTS2
Tables 1a and 1b reproduce the results of Johnson et al. (1998) using their data 
set.3 The explanatory variables include Regulation1 (Heritage Foundation’s busi-
ness freedom index); Regulation2 (World Economic Forum’s measure of regula-
tory discretion); Regulation3 (Political Risk Services Group’s (PRSG) measure 
of bureaucratic quality); Regulation4 (Heritage Foundation’s measure of overall 
economic freedom); Taxation1 (World Economic Forum’s (WEF) measure of 
tax burden); Taxation2 (Fraser Institute’s measure of marginal income tax rate); 
Leg Env1 (PRSG’s measure of law and order); Leg Env2 (Heritage Foundation’s 
1  The DYMIMIC method infers the size of the shadow economy from variables such as di-
rect and indirect taxation, custom duties, government regulations, the rate of unemployment, 
growth rate of real GDP, and currency circulation. In order to calibrate absolute figures of the 
size of the shadow economies from the relative DYMIMIC estimation results, they used previ-
ous estimates derived using the currency demand method.
2  All estimations use STATA version 11. 
3  The data set is available at http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EX
TRESEARCH/0,contentMDK:20701021~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:46
9382,00.html
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Table A
Data description
Variables taken from Johnson et al. 
(for the year 1997) Panel data (for 1999–2007)
Code Description
Regulation1 Business freedom heritage: It is a measure of the ability to start, operate, and close 
a business that represents the overall burden of regulation as well as the efficiency 
of government in the regulatory process. High scores indicate a freer business en-
vironment. Source: Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index.
Regulation2 Regulatory discretion: World Economic 
Forum’s (WEF) measure of regulatory 
discretion. Higher values indicate lesser 
regulatory discretion. 
Regulation3 Bureaucratic quality: A measure of the institutional strength and quality of the 
bureaucracy. High points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the 
strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions 
in government services. Sources: International Country Risk Guide Services and 
The Political Risk Services Group.
Regulation4 Economic freedom: It is a measure of the ability to start, operate, and close a busi-
ness that represents the overall burden of regulation as well as the efficiency of 
government in the regulatory process. High scores indicate a freer business envi-
ronment. Source: Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index.
Regulation5 Regulation quality: It captures percep-
tions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. Sources: 
Kaufmann et al. (2010), World Govern-
ance Indicators.
Taxation1 Tax burden: WEF’s measure of the tax 
burden. A higher value means lesser 
burden. 
Taxation2 Marginal income tax rate: Fraser Institute’s measure of the marginal income tax 
rate. It assigns lower ratings to countries with higher tax rates at lower income 
brackets. 
Taxation3 Fiscal freedom heritage: It measures the 
tax burden imposed by the government. 
It includes both the direct tax burden 
in terms of top tax rates on individual 
and corporate incomes, and the overall 
amount of tax revenue as a percentage 
of GDP. Source: Heritage Foundation, 
www.heritage.org/index/about
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Variables taken from Johnson et al. 
(for the year 1997) Panel data (for 1999–2007)
Code Description
Leg Env1 Law and order: It is a measure of two components, “law” and “order”. The law 
subcomponent is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal sys-
tem, while the order subcomponent is an assessment of the popular observance 
of the law. Higher values indicate greater law and order effectiveness. Sources: 
International Country Risk Guide Services and The Political Risk Services Group, 
www.prsgroup.com 
Leg Env2 Property rights: It is an assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate 
private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. Source: 
Heritage Foundation, www.heritage.org/index/about
Leg Env3 Equality of citizens before the law: Fra-
ser Institute’s measure of civil liberties 
and political rights. Higher scores indi-
cate greater rights and liberties. 
Leg Env4 Rule of law: It captures the percep-
tion of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. Sourc-
es: Kaufmann et al. (2010), World Gov-
ernance Indicators, World Bank.
Corruption1 Transparency international’s index for 
corruption perceptions. Higher values 
indicate lesser corruption. 
Corruption2 Bribery index: The World Economic 
Forum’s survey based measure of bribes 
in the public sector. Higher scores cor-
respond to lower corruption. 
Corruption3 Impulse’s exporter bribery index: Inci-
dence of bribery in the public sector in a 
foreign country as reported by German 
traders and investors abroad. 
Corruption4 Corruption control: It captures per-
ceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, in-
cluding both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as “capture” of state 
by the elites and private interests. Sourc-
es: Kaufmann et al. (2010), Governance 
Indicators, World Bank.
Corruption5 Corruption ICRG: It is an assessment of 
the corruption within the political sys-
tem. Higher values indicate lower cor-
ruption. Sources: International Country 
Risk Guide Services and The Political 
Risk Services Group. 
www.prsgroup.com
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measure of property rights); Leg Env3 (Fraser Institute’s measure of the equality 
of citizens before the law); Leg Env4 (World Governance Indicator’s measure of 
the rule of law); Corruption1 (Transparency International’s index of corruption); 
Corruption2 (WEF’s measure of bribes in the public sector); Corruption3 (Im-
pulse’s exporter bribery index); Corruption4 (WGI’s index of control of corrup-
tion); Corruption5 (PRSG’s measure of public sector corruption).
The results tell us that more restrictive regulations from business point of view 
increase the size of the shadow economy (Columns 1a.1 to 1a.4 in Table 1a); a 
greater tax burden is unsustainable with the larger size of shadow economy (Col-
umns 1a.5 and 1a.6 in Table 1a); a more effective law and order implementation 
helps attract economic activity in the official sector (Columns 1b.1 to 1b.3 in Ta-
ble 1b); and public sector corruption has a negative effect on business decisions 
(Columns 1b.4 and 1b.5 in Table 1b) and a positive one on the size of the unof-
ficial sector (Column 1b.6 in Table 1b). These tables echo the results of Tables 1 
and 2 in the study of Johnson et al. (1998). 
The results using panel data are shown in Tables 2a, 2b and 3a, 3b. Following 
the recommendation of Beck – Katz (1995), we reported panel corrected standard 
errors which are robust against heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.4 In Table 
2a, I have used two measures of regulation (Regulation3 and Regulation5). Regu-
lation3 is similar to Johnson et al. (1998), whereas Regulation5 is a new meas-
ure. Our results, like those of Johnson et al. (1998), indicate a negative relation 
between the quality of governance and the size of the unofficial economy (col-
umns 1 and 2). In the next two columns (3 and 4), we have used two measures of 
taxation (Taxation2 and Taxation3). Taxation2 is similar to Johnson et al. (1998), 
whereas Taxation3 is a new measure. The coefficients on these measures of taxa-
tion are positive and significant, indicating that the larger size of the shadow 
economy is not sustainable with lower tax rates.
In Table 2b, we have presented the results of the effect of the legal environment 
(Leg Env1 and Leg Env4) on the unofficial economy using two measures of legal 
environment. The first measure (Leg Env1) is similar to the measure of law and or-
der used by Johnson et al. (1998). The results indicate the negative and significant 
impact of a good legal environment on the unofficial economy (columns 1 and 2). 
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 2b, we have employed two measures of corruption 
(Corruption4 and Corruption5). The higher values of these indices are associated 
with lower corruption. Our results indicate that the lower the corruption, the low-
er the size of the unofficial economy. This result supports the evidence of Dreher 
– Schneider (2010) that the shadow economy and corruption are complements.  
4  We do not use individual specific fixed effects because there is not enough within variation in 
the variables of our sample, in particular the size of the shadow economy. 
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Table 1a
Unofficial economy, regulation, and taxation (JKZ data)
Independent Var. 1a.1 1a.2 1a.3 1a.4 1a.5 1a.6
Regulation1b 8.060***
(2.057)
Regulation2a –2.913
(2.941)
Regulation3a –7.728***
(2.459)
Regulation4a –0.363
(0.884)
Taxation1a –6.485***
(1.887)
Taxation2a 1.901***
(0.686)
GDP pc log –7.273*** –7.425** –1.040 –7.421*** –7.304*** –6.987***
(1.162) (3.137) (2.942) (2.737) (1.537) (1.320)
Observations 47 34 39 43 34 42
R-square 0.615 0.598 0.654 0.440 0.680 0.572
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; a A higher value of 
this variable means better outcome for private business; b A higher value of this variable means 
worse outcome for private business. Constant is included but not reported.
Table 1b
Unofficial economy, legal environment, and corruption (JKZ data)
Independent var. 1b.1 1b.2 1b.3 1b.4 1b.5 1b.6
Leg Env1a –9.307***
(2.385)
Leg Env2b 8.023**
(3.527)
Leg Env3a –2.328***
(0.656)
Corruption1a –3.482***
(1.061)
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Table 1b continued
Independent var. 1b.1 1b.2 1b.3 1b.4 1b.5 1b.6
Corruption2a –3.881*
(2.197)
Corruption3b 0.828*
(0.451)
GDP pc log –1.850 –4.785* –5.227*** –3.999* –5.807* –6.464***
(2.031) (2.378) (1.583) (1.997) (3.262) (2.122)
Observations 39 47 43 43 34 44
R-square 0.781 0.584 0.603 0.605 0.627 0.512
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; a A higher 
value of this variable means better outcome for private business; b A higher value of 
this variable means worse outcome for private business. Constant is included but not 
reported.
Table 2a
Unofficial economy, regulation, and taxation (Panel data 1999–2007)
Independent var. 2a.1 2a.2 2a.3 2a.4
Regulation3 –5.375***
(0.211)
Regulation5 –4.046***
(0.258)
Taxation2 0.967***
(0.040)
Taxation3 0.172***
(0.013)
GDP pc log –2.831*** –3.695*** –7.228*** –6.232***
(0.180) (0.176) (0.108) (0.057)
Observations 1160 1083 862 1291
No. of countries 132 158 118 150
R-square 0.503 0.446 0.467 0.445
÷2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Panel Corrected Standard Errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Constant 
is included but not reported.
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Table 2b
Unofficial economy, legal environment, and corruption (Panel data 1999–2007)
Independent var. 2b.5 2b.6 2b.7 2b.8
Legal Env1 –3.399***
(0.222)
Legal Env4 –7.103***
(0.251)
Corruption4 –6.051***
(0.262)
Corruption5 –2.832***
(0.359)
GDP pc log –4.253*** –1.888*** –2.500*** –4.992***
(0.162) (0.167) (0.163) (0.211)
Observations 1160 1083 1083 1160
No. of countries 132 158 158 132
R-square 0.498 0.531 0.514 0.469
÷2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Panel Corrected Standard Errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Constant 
is included but not reported.
Table 3a
Unofficial economy, regulation, and taxation
Arellano–Bond Estimator (Panel data 1999–2007)
Independent var. (3a.1) (3a.2) (3a.3) (3a.4)
Lag unoff eco 0.804*** 0.458*** 0.655*** 0.669***
(0.088) (0.102) (0.090) (0.104)
GDP pc log –2.451*** –4.430*** –3.323*** –3.061***
(0.514) (0.560) (0.539) (0.601)
Regulation3 –0.508***
(0.137)
Regulation5 –0.379***
(0.142)
Taxation2 0.024
(0.017)
Taxation3 0.007**
(0.003)
Observations 901 768 743 994
No. of countries 132 158 117 149
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Table 3a continued
Arellano–Bond test of zero 
autocorrelation:  AR(1) p-value 0.001 0.290 0.002 0.001
AR(2) p-value 0.040 0.720 0.285 0.042
Sargan test (p-value) 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000
No. of instruments 28 19 25 28
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Constant is included 
but not reported. 
Table 3b
Unofficial economy, legal environment, and corruption
Arrelano–Bond Estimator (Panel data 1999–2007)
Independent var. (3b.1) (3b.2) (3b.3) (3b.4)
Lag unofficial eco. 0.871*** 0.493*** 0.783*** 0.482***
(0.093) (0.104) (0.108) (0.102)
GDP pc log –2.097*** –4.216*** –2.686*** –4.317***
(0.546) (0.583) (0.664) (0.576)
Legal Env1 –0.230**
(0.111)
Legal Env4 –0.534***
(0.196)
Corruption5 –0.128*
(0.066)
Corruption4 –0.295***
(0.105)
Observations 901 768 901 768
No. of countries 132 158 132 158
Arellano–Bond test of zero 
autocorrelation:  AR(1) p-value 0.001 0.190 0.000 0.202
AR(2) p-value 0.028 0.605 0.042 0.589
Sargan test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of instruments 28 19 28 19
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Constant is included 
but not reported.
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4.  CAUSALITY ANALYSIS
It is important to search empirically for the causal effects assumed in theoretical 
studies. Therefore, we try to identify the causal impact of the regulatory discre-
tion on the shadow economy. Given the difficulties in finding the instruments for 
all three sets of our variables, I use the Arellano – Bond (1991) estimator, which 
uses the own past values of the endogenous regressors as instruments. 
Tables 3a and 3b show the results. The two crucial assumptions of the Arel-
lano–Bond estimator are the absence of serial correlation in the error term beyond 
order 1 and the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. The bottom panel of 
the table provides the test hypothesis on these two assumptions. As is clear from 
the table, in most of the cases there exist serial correlation beyond order one. At 
the same time, the Sargan test clearly indicates that overidentifying restrictions 
are not valid. Although the coefficients of our regressions are in line with the 
earlier findings, but the failure to satisfy the assumptions of the Arellano–Bond 
estimator do not permit a valid inference.5 
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the relationship between regulatory discretion and the size 
of the unofficial economy. The paper endorses the findings of Johnson et al. 
(1998), Dreher – Schnieder (2010) and Buehn – Schneider (2012), and adds two 
important dimensions to their results. First, it produces the same results using a 
much larger data set than the previous authors, thus filling the important gap in 
terms of country coverage. Secondly, the paper attempts to discover the causal 
connection between the shadow economy size and business regulation. The re-
sults of the causal analysis using the Arellano–Bond estimator suffer from weak 
instrument and serial correlation problems. A more rigorous causal analysis could 
be an important motivation for future research in this area.  
5  Inclusion of 2 or more lags of the dependent variable on the right hand side eliminates auto-
correlation in some cases, but it does not affect the outcome of the overidentifying restriction 
test. 
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